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Abstract (100 words) 
 
The Basel III Accord on a ‘Global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking 
systems’ was issued in late 2010 as the cornerstone of the international regulatory response to 
the global financial crisis. Its adoption into European Union (EU) legislation has, however, 
been met with considerable member state reticence and intra-EU negotiations are ongoing. 
This paper investigates the political economy of new capital requirements in the EU, arguing 
that the institutional features of national banking sectors convincingly account for the 
divergence in EU member state preferences on capital rules.  
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Introduction 
Since the global financial crisis delivered a major blow to the financial stability of much of 
the European Union (EU), financial regulation has moved to the centre stage of debates about 
the future of EU economic governance. Capital requirements for banks have traditionally 
been regarded as one of the main instruments to ensure the stability of the banking sector and 
hence financial stability tout court. Capital requirements are regulations limiting the amount 
of leverage that financial firms can take on.2 As the US treasury minister Timothy Geithner 
put it in the wake of the financial crisis ‘The top three things to get done are capital, capital 
and capital’ (Washington Post, 25 March 2010). At the peak of the crisis the interbank 
markets froze, highlighting the importance of banks’ holding of liquid assets3 in order to meet 
short-term obligations. Hence, in addition to capital requirements, liquidity rules also made it 
into the zeitgeist of banking regulation. 
 
In 1988, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) issued the Basel I Accord on 
‘International convergence of capital measurement and capital standards’, which was updated 
by the Basel II Accord in 2004 (revised in 2005).  Over time, these ‘soft’ international rules 
have been incorporated into (legally binding) national legislation. In the EU this was done 
through the capital requirements directives (CRD) (see Underhill 1998; Christopoulos and 
Quaglia 2009; Quaglia 2010). The Basel III accord (hereafter Basel III) was issued in late 
2010 as the cornerstone of the international regulatory response to the global financial crisis 
(BCBS 2010). Its adoption into EU law has, however, met with considerable member state 
and EU institutional reticence. The EU directive and regulation to be adopted (referred to 
collectively as CRDIV) will likely qualify the application of the Basel III capital requirements 
in the EU.  
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The EU is one of the largest financial jurisdictions worldwide and some scholars have indeed 
pointed out its ‘market power’ (Damro 2012; see also Dür 2011). In terms of total banking 
assets and liabilities, the EU’s internal market is larger than that of the US. Hence, the 
implementation of Basel III into EU legislation will be consequential not only for its large 
internal market and the 6000 European banks therein, but also for the stability of the 
international financial system. Third jurisdictions, first and foremost the US, which is the 
main counterpart of the EU in international financial fora (Posner 2009; Posner and Veron 
2010), are also concerned about potential regulatory arbitrage and competitive advantages 
accruing to European banks as a result of the ‘distinctive’ implementation of Basel rules in 
the EU.  
 
In the making of the Basel III accord first and in the negotiations of the CRD IV later, the 
core of the controversy concerned the distributive implications of the regulatory changes 
proposed.  The definition of capital (in particular the list of financial instruments that count as 
capital); the level of capital requirements; the definition of liquid assets and the amount of 
liquid assets affect different banks and national banking systems in different ways, imposing 
costs as well as benefits that are not equally distributed. Different banks have different 
sources of capital; some banks have capital instruments or liquid assets that other banks do 
not have; some banks are better positioned than others to meet higher capital requirements or 
liquidity coverage. Hence, banks and national banking systems face different adjustment costs 
to the proposed rules: it very much depends on the features of the national banking system 
and the domestic regulatory framework. It also depends on the link between the financial 
system and the real economy, in particular in terms of the major sources of funding for non 
financial companies and the relative importance of bank credit. If companies mainly rely on 
credit from banks, rather than raising funds on the stock market or issuing securities, higher 
	   4	  
capital and liquidity requirements are more likely to result in a credit crunch for the real 
economy. 
 
In order to explain the politics of the CRD IV, that is member states and industry preferences 
in the negotiations on the new capital and liquidity rules, this article builds on and develops 
further the literature that examines the specific features of national banking systems (Allen 
and Gale 2000; Deeg 2010; Hardie and Howarth 2013) and links these features to member 
states and industry preferences concerning EU financial regulation (Busch 2004; Fioretos 
2001, 2010; McCarthy 2010; Zimmerman 2010; for a somewhat different version of this 
argument see Mügge 2010). Adopting a comparative political economy analysis, this article 
sees member state and industry preferences determined by a combination of political 
economy factors and, notably, the institutional features of the national banking sector. This 
analysis involves digging into the balance sheets of banks in the main EU countries, their 
assets and liabilities (i.e., how banks are funded). The impact of state intervention during the 
recent financial crisis on banks’ capital position is also considered. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the negotiations and the 
content of the new capital rules in the EU. Section 3 investigates the political economy of 
these rules in the main European countries. It is argued that the divergence in EU member 
state preferences on Basel III / CRDIV – rooted in differences in national banking systems –
explains the incomplete nature of European economic governance in the area of financial 
regulation and accounts for the intergovernmental character of many EU negotiations in this 
policy field. 
 
The content and negotiations of the new EU capital legislation 
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The Basel III accord was signed by the BCBS in December 2010 (BCBS 2010). The new 
rules: provide a more restrictive definition of what counts as bank capital; increase the risk 
weight of several assets in the banking book and introduce capital buffers; set up a 
recommended and potentially obligatory leverage ratio; and outline international rules on 
liquidity management. All in all, the new rules increase the proportion of capital that must be 
of proven loss absorbing capacity (going concern) – i.e., core tier one (equity) capital – over 
Basel II requirements, and will be phased in gradually from January 2013 until 2019. The 
Basel III accord is an agreement between national regulators gathered in the BCBS; hence it 
has to be implemented into national (and / or EU) legislation in order to become legally 
binding.  
 
In July 2011, after extensive consultations conducted in parallel with the work of the BCBS, 
the EU Commission adopted the CRDIV legislative package designed to replace the CRDII 
with a directive that governs the access to deposit-taking activities (Commission 2011a) and a 
regulation that establishes prudential requirements for credit institutions (Commission 2011b). 
After its approval, the proposed directive (Commission 2011a) will have to be transposed by 
the member states in a way suitable to their own national environment. It contains rules 
concerning the taking up and pursuit of the business of banks, the conditions for the freedom 
of establishment and the freedom to provide services, the supervisory review process and the 
definition of competent authorities. The directive also incorporates two elements of the Basel 
III accord, namely the introduction of two capital buffers in addition to the minimum capital 
requirements: the capital conservation buffer identical for all banks in the EU and the 
countercyclical capital buffer to be determined at national level. The proposed EU regulation 
(CRR) (Commission 2011b) contains prudential requirements for credit institutions and 
investment firms. The proposed regulation covers the definition of capital, increasing the 
amount of own funds that banks need to hold as well as the quality of those funds; it 
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introduces the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) — the exact composition and calibration of 
which will be determined after an observation and review period in 2015; and the need to 
consider a leverage ratio, subject to supervisory review.  
 
The Commission’s CRDIV draft, which would implement Basel III into EU law, is the most 
substantial of all the post-financial crisis regulatory measures entertained to date at the EU-
level but its draft also involved watering down or modifying the Basel III guidelines in ways 
to meet EU member state demands (IMF 2011a). Indeed, the CRDIV draft was criticised by 
many regulators and by the IMF for significantly watering down key Basel III elements (IMF 
2011). Speaking at a meeting of EU Economic and Finance ministers held to discuss the CRD 
IV, the British Treasury minister complained that ‘We are not implementing the Basel 
agreement, as anyone who will look at this text will be able to tell you’ (Financial Times, 2 
May 2012). 
 
The Commission ‘softened’ its definition of core tier I capital relative to the Basel III 
recommendations in some areas. Notably, the Commission draft allows ‘silent participations’, 
that is, state loans that make up a significant part of the capital of many EU banks, including 
the publicly owned German Landesbanken. The Commission’s draft also limits the role of the 
leverage ratio designed to limit risk-taking at banks. The almost unique reliance on Basel III’s 
risk-weighted core tier 1 ratio in the Commission’s draft CRDIV was criticised for 
inadequately representing the health of the European banking sector (Financial Times 30 
January 2012).4 On liquidity, the Commission adopts the less prescriptive definition of liquid 
assets:  for the LCR to include ‘transferable assets that are of extremely high liquidity and 
credit quality’ and ‘transferable assets that are of high liquidity and credit quality’. The 
Commission’s draft lacks a firm commitment to implement the Net Stable Funding Ratio by 
2018 called for in Basel III. The Commission’s proposed regulation also sets higher capital 
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requirements for Over the Counter derivatives that are not cleared though Central 
Counterparties.  
 
The use of a regulation, which once approved is directly applicable without the need for 
national transposition, is designed to ensure the creation of a single rule book in the EU. The 
regulation will eliminate a key source of national divergence. In the CRD II, more than one 
hundred national discretions (differences in national legislation transposing the EU directive) 
remained. Yet, the Commission’s draft regulation also proposes a maximum capital ratio 
which was opposed by many who argued in favour of EU standards that exceed the Basel 
minimum because of prevailing balance sheet uncertainties in the EU, the lack of EU-wide 
resolution arrangements and a fully unified fiscal backstop. The analysis below will 
demonstrate that most of these modifications to Basel III in CRDIV owe to French and 
German government demands.  
 
Following the agreement on Basel III and during the intra-EU negotiations on CRDIV, some 
of the compromises reached in the BCBS unravelled. Several EU member states, the 
European Parliament (EP) and even the Commission itself called for the taking into account 
of ‘European specificities’ in incorporating the Basel III rules into the CRD IV, reopening 
some of the issues that had caused friction within the BCBS. Basel III applied to 
internationally active banks, whereas EU legislation was to apply to all banks, making some 
Basel III provisions — notably the calculation of tier 1 — impossible to apply in EU member 
states without a massive shift in the structure of a large range of banks and banking systems. 
The Commission has justified its decision to apply Basel III rules, as with Basel I and Basel 
II, to all EU banks on both stability grounds and reasons linked to the application of EU 
Competition Policy (Paulis 2012). Both the Commission and the EP have also emphasised 
competition concerns and the need to ensure an ‘international level playing field’. Of 
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particular concern has been the fact that in the US, the Basel III accord would be applied only 
to financial institutions with over (US)$50bn in assets (EP 2010, 2011).  
 
The political economy of new EU capital rules 
 
This section engages in a political economy analysis of national preferences on EU capital 
requirements. These preferences reflect three factors: the capital, and thus competitive, 
position of national banks; national banking and financial system structure; and related 
macro-economic considerations, that is the impact of Basel III on the wider economy.  
 
Capital position 
The first explanation focuses specifically on the capital position of banks and relates to the 
likely impact of recapitalization upon their market share and competitiveness. Basel III / 
CRDIV will force banks to hold 6 per cent tier-1 and 8 per cent tier-1 and tier-2 capital by 
2015 and four years later — with the capital conservation buffer of 2.5 per cent to be phased 
in by 2019 — 8.5 per cent and 10.5 per cent respectively. The obligation to raise a bank’s tier-
1 capital ratio can have one or both of two effects. To meet those requirements the banks 
either need to reduce their assets (including lending) (i.e., decrease the Risk Weighted Assets 
(RWA) denominator) or retain earnings (i.e., increase the capital base numerator). If the 
former is undertaken then profits will be lower; if the latter then discretionary payments such 
as dividends on equity will decrease. Ceteris paribus, both developments make the bank less 
attractive to investors. However – it should also be noted – that many investors are also 
focused upon the long-term stability of banks, especially in the difficult market conditions of 
the early 2010s, which provides an incentive to banks to recapitalise.  
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While the capital position of different banks within a national economy varies considerably, 
systemic patterns can be detected. The studies and impact assessment of the BCBS of new 
Basel III rules were conducted at the aggregate level. Nonetheless, even the BCBS warned 
about differentiated effects across countries, without identifying those with banking systems 
most affected (BCBS 2010). A perusal of the equity and tier 1 capital for systemically 
important British, French, German banks shows why the German government in particular 
had good reasons to oppose the rigid tightening of capital requirements. The German 
government also favoured a maximum harmonization rule in order to prevent better 
capitalized banks from gaining competitive advantage and expanding market share at the 
expense of undercapitalized (German) banks (see Tables 1 and 2). Faced with adverse capital 
conditions, the two large German commercial banks would only narrowly respect the Basel 
III target for 2015. The data also show that most of the main British banks would have limited 
difficulties in meeting the Basel III standards. The data help to explain why the British 
government was most in favour of tighter capital rules and most opposed to a maximum 
harmonization rule. The data on French banks suggest their strong position but the double 
counting of insurance subsidiaries — which Basel III recommends banning — inflates the tier 
1 capital ratio significantly in most cases.  
 
[TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 1:  Bank equity as percentage of total assets (core tier 1) and leverage ratio in 
parentheses 
Recall: core tier 1 
ratio of 4.5%/or 7% 
with the ‘capital 
UK France Germany 
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conservation buffer’ 
from 2019. 
2008 3.7 (27) 3.8 (26.3) 2.93 (34.1) 
2009 4.87 (20.5) 4.91 (20.4) 3.76 (26.6) 
2010 5.37 (18.6) 5.07 (19.7) 3.88 (25.8) 
Source ECB Statistical data warehouse. Domestic banking group and stand alone banks only. 
 
Table 2:  Tier 1 capital (as a percentage of total assets) main British, German and 
French systematically important banks (non-weighted average)* 
Recall:  Basel III target of 
6% / or 8.5% with the ‘capital 
conservation buffer’ from 
2019. 
2012 
baseline 
scenario 
2012 
adverse 
2011 
baseline 
scenario 
2011 
adverse 
UK 10.4 7.45 9.75 7.95 
France 9 7.4 8.5 7.7 
Germany 8.8 6.4 7.85 6.75 
Source: EBA *Results of the stress test based on the full static balance sheet assumption 
without any mitigating actions, mandatory restructuring or capital raisings post 31 December 
2010/11 (all government support measures fully paid in before 31 December 2010/11 are 
included).  Figures cover the largest four banks in UK and France and largest two in 
Germany. 
 
The implications of the new capital rules were potentially greatest for the many non-listed 
public sector and mutual banks (a much more significant element of the German and French 
banking systems than in the UK) which did not use equity, relying on other capital to meet 
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capital requirements in the past including hybrids — that is, capital which has some features 
of both debt and equity and notably ‘silent participations’ (government loans) (Financial 
Times, 10 September 2010). Basel III menaced a significant overhaul of the capital structure 
and legal status of internationally active publicly-owned banks and mutuals — although 
exceptions could have been allowed which did not apply to commercial banks with listed 
equity. Proportionately, the ban on hybrids would hit the German banking system the most 
and in particular the Landesbanken which explains the Commission’s CRDIV draft provision 
to continue to allow only the one form of hybrid on which they rely to meet the core tier-1 
ratio: ‘silent participations’. The ban on all other hybrids was incorporated into the European 
Banking Authority’s late 2011 stress-tests of systemically important banks, resulting in the 
withdrawal of one German LB, Helaba (the Hessen-Thüringen LB) in order to avoid public 
failure (Financial Times 13 July 2011). The Basel III ban on hybrids has also already hit the 
two large German commercial banks despite the qualification of the ban in the CRDIV draft. 
In early 2012, Commerzbank moved to boost investor confidence by replacing its hybrid 
capital (‘silent participations’) with equity in order to improve its core tier-1 position 
(Financial Times 23 February 2012). 
 
The IMF estimated that a ban on double counting of capital in banks’ insurance subsidiaries 
would result in French banks losing a total of 28.9 per cent of their tier 1 capital, preventing 
several from meeting the 6 per cent threshold and all from meeting the 8.5 per cent threshold 
(with the capital conservation buffer to be in place from 2019) (IMF, 2011b). It is not 
surprising then that the French government (and to a less extent the German) lobbied to lift 
the restrictions in Basel III on double counting. A ban would hit the three large French 
commercial banks particularly hard because of the longstanding feature the French banking 
system of bancassurance, in which insurance companies (often subsidiaries of banks) make 
use of banks to market their products. The system predominates in certain other EU member 
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states, including Spain and Austria. However, the lifting of the Basel III restriction also 
benefited the part-state owned Lloyds-TSB, which is one of Britain’s largest insurance 
providers. 
 
Basel II guidelines and CRDII rules on bank capital allow banks to amass assets with high 
credit ratings without setting capital aside to cover potential losses. This allowed many banks 
in Europe to become highly leveraged despite meeting international rules on capital cushions. 
European Central Bank (ECB) and several other central bank officials pushed for a leverage 
ratio as a simple mechanism to curb excessive risk-taking (Financial Times, 2 February 
2012). The French, German and a range of other EU member states governments opposed the 
adoption of a leverage ratio to determine the quantity of capital to be held by banks, which 
explains why the specific Basel III provision (3 per cent or an assets to tier 1 capital ratio of 
approximately 33) was made more flexible in the Commission’s CRDIV draft.  
 
French and German opposition reflected the much higher leverage ratios of most large banks 
in France and Germany (compared to the UK), the difficult situation facing German 
Landesbanken and French mutual banks having to respect a new leverage ratio and the fear of 
the need to force through a rapid de-leveraging of banks. While the leverage ratio of British 
banks increased dramatically in the two years prior to the outbreak of the financial crisis, this 
had been historically amongst the lowest in the EU and it dropped quickly in 2009 and 2010. 
The figures for French banks appear similarly low. However, the Basel III ban on double 
counting the capital of insurance subsidiaries — if adopted in EU legislation — would hit the 
leverage ratios for the three biggest French commercial banks considerably.  
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The British government has been the most in favour of the big three for closely aligning 
CRDIV and Basel III (IMF 2011). The British Conservative-Liberal Democrat government 
(joined by several other member state governments including the Swedish) criticised the 
Commission’s CRDIV draft on the grounds that it did not go far enough (see for example, 
Djankov 2011). In particular, the British opposed the move under CRDIV to embrace a 
leverage ratio for guidance purposes only and sought to keep open the possibility of imposing 
capital requirements higher than those eventually set by EU legislation, which the 
Commission’s CRDIV draft explicitly blocked by imposing a cap. Many British policy-
makers, including the Governor of the Bank of England, were critical of the Commission’s 
position on a maximum capital ratio, arguing that the new level of required capital should 
have been many times higher than the levels set out in Basel III (Financial Times, 26 October 
2011). The British Independent Commission on Banking recommended that large retail banks 
be required to have a minimum core tier-1 ratio of 10 per cent of risk-weighted assets which 
would significantly exceed the Basel III minimum of 7 per cent (core tier-1 at 4.5 per cent 
plus the 2.5 per cent capital conservation buffer and the proposed surcharge for global 
systemically important banks — possibly up to 2.5 per cent. Other (mainly continental policy) 
makers, such as the former Governor of the Bank of France, Jacques de Larosière, argued that 
‘Basel rules risk punishing the wrong banks’, that is the  ‘diversified’ and ‘safer’ continental 
European banks, rather the Anglo-Saxon banks which, he claimed, engaged in riskier 
investment banking activities (Financial Times, 26 October  2010 p. 11). 
 
The structure of banking and financial systems 
The second political economy explanation focuses on the structure of banking and financial 
systems and how these structures shape the activities of banks (Allen and Gale 2000; Hardie 
and Howarth 2009; Hardie and Howarth 2013). This explanation reminds us that British and 
French commercial banks are better capitalised because, on average, they rely more on equity 
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finance in relative terms than banks in most continental European countries (see Table 1 
above). As noted above, many banks on the continent such as the publicly owned German 
Landesbanken, cooperative and savings banks and most French mutuals do not have equity 
finance. Indeed, this aspect proved problematic in the incorporation of the Basel III accord 
into EU legislation, which contains specific provisions for the cooperative and mutual banks. 
Basel III was written having in mind banks funded by equity finance (hence the emphasis on 
common equities in core tier 1 capital), whereas many banks in the EU are based on other 
sources of funding.  
 
The overall equity position of banks in all three countries improved following the financial 
crisis (with increases of 45 per cent in the UK; 45 per cent in France; and most in Germany at 
67 per cent although from a lower position). In all three countries the equity / capital position 
improved in part because of significant government interventions in the banking system 
which involved share purchases. For the UK, government intervention came far more, in 
comparative terms, in the form of share purchase (6.3 per cent of GDP versus only 1.2 per 
cent in Germany, where the government opted more to purchase toxic assets, and 1.1 per cent 
of GDP in France — at end 2009) (National Central Bank figures). No other national share 
purchase programme came close to reaching the British level, in either real terms or in terms 
relative to GDP. 
 
There are other, less obvious, features of national banking systems which explain positioning 
on CRDIV. French and German bank and government opposition to the use of a simple 
leverage rule, as opposed to risk-weighted assets, owes in large part to the relative importance 
of trade financing in their operations. Trade financing is high in terms of overall assets but 
low in terms of risk-weighted assets. Similarly, different levels of bank and banking system 
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exposure to short-term funding on wholesale markets directed national preferences on CRDIV 
liquidity rules.  
 
Basel III liquidity rules effectively discourage reliance on short term funding (less than a 
year) on wholesale markets. Clearly British bank reliance on short-term funding (less than 
year) was the highest of the three countries in 2007, and much of this was short term funding 
of less than three months. The boom in British bank lending over the decade preceding the 
crisis owed in part to this short-term funding. But by 2010 this reliance had dropped 
dramatically, moving from above 60 per cent of GDP to 30 per cent (own calculations on the 
basis of central bank data), contributing to the credit crunch in the British economy (see 
below). UK banks have gone the furthest, and by a significant margin, to reduce their reliance 
on short-term funding and increase the resilience of their funding positions and thus they and 
the British authorities are most comfortable with the liquidity rules and ambitious phase-in 
dates. This improved position owed in large part to the early introduction in 2009 of 
restrictive liquidity rules in the UK, on which the Basel III and CRDIV rules were largely 
modelled. British banks thus had a head start on liquidity. 
 
The German government was less preoccupied about Basel III liquidity rules given that 
German bank debt was issued principally in the form of longer maturity covered bonds — 
pfandbrief – itself a reflection of the ‘patient capital’ that characterises the German financial 
system. For German banks, reliance on short term funding was low, dropping from slightly 
above 10 per cent in 2007 to slightly below 10 per cent of GDP in 2010. However, in the case 
of French banks, reliance on short term funding was far greater and dropped only marginally 
from a high of 45 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 40 per cent by 2010. The comparatively high 
reliance of French banks – and bank lending – on short term debt largely explains the French 
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government’s push to make CRDIV liquidity rules less prescriptive (Financial Times, 2 
February 2012).  Basel III includes a prolonged phase-in period for the Liquidity Coverage 
Ratio (2015) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (2018), while the Commission’s CRDIV draft 
waters down the first ratio and fails to impose the second. This preference for gradualism and 
flexibility can be explained by concerns about the potential impact of these liquidity measures 
on bank lending.  
	  
Differences in national financial systems – and notably, differences in the funding of non 
financial companies – also shaped government policy. Small and medium-sized companies in 
the three countries were most exposed to potential de-leveraging given their limited access to 
other funding sources. However, overall non financial company reliance on bank credit, as 
opposed to equity and securities, varied markedly. Reliance was particularly high in 
Germany, where bank credit comprised about 50 per cent of non financial company external 
funding in 2011. In France, bank credit amounted to only 30 per cent of non financial 
company external funding in 2011, while in the UK, the figure reached only 27 per cent (ECB 
statistics data warehouse, national central bank data). The comparison with non financial 
company external funding in the United States – only 13 per cent from bank credit – indicates 
even more clearly the comparatively heavy reliance in Germany and its underdeveloped 
equity markets (Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, December 2011 release).	  
	  
Differing macro-economic concerns 
The heavy reliance of non financial companies in most European countries on bank credit 
finance, the comparatively limited role of equity and corporate debt markets in many 
countries and the strong bank-industry link (hausbank / relational banking in Germany) 
further explains the preoccupation of many European governments as to the impact of Basel 
	   17	  
III on bank lending and the real economy. This leads us to the third, macroeconomic, factor 
that explains differing national positions on Basel III / CRDIV. The BCBS accepted the 
negative implications of pushing too hard and too fast with capital rules — especially in the 
aftermath of a deep post-crisis recession in many European countries (see BCBS 2010).  
 
These concerns were particularly acute in some countries. The United Kingdom was not one 
of them. From the outbreak of the financial crisis, bank lending in the UK shrunk dramatically 
(Table 3). This is part of a more general story about the early deleveraging of British banks 
and the collapse of lending, which had previously relied on securitisation and short term bank 
funding on wholesale markets (Hardie and Howarth 2013). The British Treasury Minister 
George Osborne spoke repeatedly of the ‘British dilemma’ – namely the desire to retain 
Britain’s world leading position in financial services but to avoid placing the British 
government (and tax payer) in a position in which it was forced bail the banks out again. 
Despite, the raft of measures adopted to encourage and facilitate bank lending (e.g. Project 
Merlin), the British government has effectively accepted the lending and economic growth 
implications of restricting bank activities and specifically decreasing the bank lending that 
relied directly on shorter-term unstable funding. 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 3: Monetary Financial Institution lending to Non-Financial Companies  
(National currencies) 
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  UK to NFCs (domestic 
only) 
France to NFCs (euro 
area) 
Germany to NFCs (euro 
area) 
2007 691.3 764.7 859.4 
2008 606.1 845.6 947.5 
2009 588.7 827.6 901.7 
2010 561.5 838.8 893.8 
2011 536.2 877.5 906.8 
Source:  National central bank data. 
 
Euro area lending by German and French banks remained comparatively strong in the five 
years following the outbreak of the financial crisis, and was limited principally by growth in 
the broader economy rather than the deleveraging efforts of banks. Forcing French and, more 
significantly, German banks to deleverage during a recessionary period could result in a credit 
crunch if banks reduced their lending (cut their risk-weighted assets denominator) instead of 
boosting their capital (lifting their equity numerator). One IMF study from 2011 on the 
differential impact of Basel III rules on national banking systems echoes the findings in a 
range of other studies: to demonstrate a particularly significant impact upon bank lending in 
Germany (with a decline of upwards of 7.73 per cent) and a smaller but still significant drop 
in the UK, with France somewhere in between (Cosimano and Hakura 2011). 
 
The two largest German commercial banks engaged in a significant de-leveraging from 2008 
and shrunk their loan book, while Landesbanken lending was largely stagnant. Stable bank 
lending levels in Germany since the outbreak of the financial crisis thus owed to a rise in 
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lending from smaller Cooperative and Savings Banks, the backbone of German small and 
medium-sized companies (the Mittelstand) (Bundesbank figures). Thus, imposing 
significantly higher capital requirements on these smaller banks would have a devastating 
impact upon the German economy. It is the largest French commercial banks – comparatively 
more engaged in retail banking than their large German competitors – and the French 
economy as a result that were most exposed to deleveraging because of higher capital 
requirements. Indeed, this fact explains why the French led the charge for the addition of a 
maximum harmonisation rule in CRDIV – also supported by the Germans – fearing that the 
British and Swedish push to move beyond Basel requirements would force French banks to be 
just as capitalised because of investor expectations (Peston 2011). The French government 
thus sought to use EU rules to try and limit the fall-out from market pressures for greater 
capital: it did not matter if the markets wanted banks to increase their capital, EU rules would 
not allow it. 
 
Conclusion: the ‘battle of the systems’ in EU economic governance 
 
More than fifteen years ago, Story and Walter (1997) argued that ‘the battle of the systems’ 
impinged upon financial integration and regulation in the EU. Despite the progress made 
following the introduction of the single currency and the re-launch of financial market 
integration in the early 2000s (Mügge 2010), the financial systems of EU member states 
retain distinctive features. These features largely explain national positions on CRDIV and the 
intergovernmental character of the negotiations in this field. Despite the ‘new era in financial 
regulation’ (Helleiner and Pagliari 2010) heralded by some authors in the wake of the crisis, 
the ‘new’ politics of EU financial regulation is rather similar to the ‘old’ one (Quaglia 2012), 
at least in certain respects, and notably with the core issue of banking regulation. 
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In countries, such as Germany, with less developed equity markets and greater non financial  
company reliance on bank credit, governments were more opposed to high capital 
requirements that would restrict lending. Clearly, British banks were concerned about the 
implications of higher capital requirements and struggled to raise capital. However, they were 
in a better position – on average – than most of their French and German competitors and the 
British government was less preoccupied with the impact of Basel III rules upon the British 
economy because of earlier deleveraging. 
 
The implementation of the Basel III rules on capital requirements is politically controversial 
in the EU and the negotiations on the new EU legislation are – as of November 2012 – 
ongoing. The intergovernmental politics of the CRDIV provides a useful case study of the 
importance of political economy explanations that undermine EU-level efforts to construct 
financial regulation that effectively stabilises the EU banking system. A conclusion of this 
article of relevance to this special issue is that the construction of EU economic governance is 
bound to be less effective than sought because of the diverging implications of EU-level rules 
for national economies. This core economic fact casts doubt on the ability of the EU to satisfy 
both markets, by facilitating cross border financial integration, and politics, through the 
provision of the public good of financial stability. 
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while she was visiting fellow at the Max Planck Institute, the European University Institute 
and Hansewissenschaftskolleg. David Howarth wishes to acknowledge financial support from 
Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland. All errors and omissions are ours. 	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2 Capital represents the portion of a bank’s assets which have no associated contractual 
commitment for repayment. It is, therefore, available as a cushion in case the value of the 
bank’s assets declines or its liabilities rise.	  
3 Liquid assets are cash or any other negotiable assets that can be quickly converted into cash.	  
4 There are wider questions being asked about the whole foundation on which Basel is built – 
i.e., risk weighted assets – hence the desire for the leverage ratio which looks at overall assets.	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